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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge. 
 
This sentencing appeal presents the narrow issue 
whether the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of 
justice under United States Sentencing Guideline S 3C1.1 is 
mandatory once the sentencing court has determined that 
the factual predicates for the enhancement have been met. 
The appellant, Stephen A. Williamson, contends that it is 
not. We hold, however, consistent with all the other circuits 
that have previously interpreted this Guideline, that it is. 
Accordingly the district court's judgment imposing sentence 




The narrow scope of Williamson's appeal renders the 
facts underlying his conviction and sentencing largely 
tangential to our decision, hence we need only outline 
them. Williamson was convicted of bank robbery following 
a jury trial and was thereafter sentenced to sixty-three 
months imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term 
of supervised release. In calculating the applicable 
Sentencing Guideline range, the district court determined 
that Williamson had perjured himself at trial -- afinding 
which the district court believed rendered the imposition of 
a two-point offense level enhancement for obstruction of 
justice mandatory. On appeal, Williamson challenges this 
aspect of his sentence. Notably, however, he does not argue 
that the district court erred in determining that he 
committed perjury at his trial or that his perjurious 
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testimony did not amount to an attempt to obstruct justice 
within the applicable guideline provision. Rather, 
Williamson appeals solely upon the narrow ground that the 
district court erroneously believed that it was required to 
apply the obstruction of justice enhancement once it 





Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides: 
 
       If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or 
       attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of 
       justice during the investigation, prosecution, or 
       sentencing of the instant offense, increase the offense 
       level by 2 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. Williamson argues that the failure of this 
Guideline to include words such as "must" or "shall" 
renders it ambiguous as to whether the increase in offense 
level must automatically follow a determination that the 
defendant has engaged in qualifying conduct. This 
ambiguity, he contends, requires application of the rule of 
lenity and thus the resolution of all doubts regarding the 
Guideline's construction in his favor. We disagree, finding 
nothing ambiguous about U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1. Rather, the 
logical structure of the Guideline ("if A, then B") clearly 
commands that a definite result -- a two level increase in 
offense level -- must follow the occurrence of a stated 
conditional event -- a finding that the defendant willfully, 
obstructed . . . the administration of justice. This reading is 
supported by the language of a recent Supreme Court 
opinion and is shared by every circuit court of appeals that 
has addressed the issue. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal matter under 18 
U.S.C. S 3231. We exercise jurisdiction over the appeal under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291 and 18 U.S.C. S 3742. Our review of the district court's 
construction and interpretation of U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1, or any sentencing 
guideline, is plenary. See United States v. Powell, 113 F.3d 464, 467 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 118 S. Ct. 454 (1997). 
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In United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S. Ct. 
1111 (1993), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's 
due process rights are not violated when a district court 
enhances a defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 
based on a finding that the defendant committed perjury 
(as opposed to other forms of obstruction of justice) at trial. 
While the question whether such an enhancement, if 
permissible, was mandatory or discretionary was not 
directly before the Court, its opinion concluded by noting 
that "[u]pon a proper determination that the accused has 
committed perjury at trial, an enhancement of sentence is 
required by the Sentencing Guidelines." 507 U.S. at 98, 113 
S. Ct. at 1119 (emphasis added). In accord with this 
language, the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eighth and Ninth circuits have all held that the obstruction 
of justice enhancement is mandatory once the sentencing 
court has determined that the factual predicates for the 
enhancement have been met. See United States v. Tracy, 36 
F.3d 199, 201 (1st Cir. 1994) ("the obstruction of justice 
enhancement is mandatory under U.S.S.G. S 3C1.1 where 
the defendant willfully obstructed or attempted to obstruct 
the administration of justice during the prosecution of the 
case"); United States v. Hernandez, 83 F.3d 582, 585 (2d 
Cir. 1996) ("Once a court finds that obstruction of justice 
took place, however, the two-level enhancement is 
mandatory"); United States v. Ashers, 968 F.2d 411, 414 
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting, in the context of obstruction of 
justice enhancement, that "application of an enhancement 
to the offense level is mandatory, as opposed to 
discretionary, in the event the defendant engaged in 
conduct that is encompassed by a guideline providing for 
an enhancement"); United States v. Velgar-Vivero, 8 F.3d 
236, 242 (5th Cir. 1993) ("The increase is not discretionary. 
If the court finds the defendant obstructed justice, it must 
impose the two point increase"); United States v. Medina, 
992 F.2d 573, 591 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing obstruction 
of justice enhancement and noting that "as we have 
explained previously, once a sentencing court makes a 
factual finding as to the applicability of a particular 
adjustment provision, the court has no discretion, but must 
increase the offense level by the amount called for in the 
applicable provision") (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); United States v. Zaragoza, 123 F.3d 472, 
485 (7th Cir. 1997) ("as the plain language of the Guideline 
reflects, the obstruction enhancement is mandated where 
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the defendant has engaged in qualifying conduct"); Hall v. 
United States, 46 F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1995) ("If Hall 
threatened the witness, the district court had no choice but 
to impose the sentence enhancement that the Guidelines 
mandate"); United States v. Ancheta, 38 F.3d 1114, 1118 
(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting language of S 3C1.1 and concluding 
"[t]his language is mandatory, not discretionary"). 
 
We join in this broad consensus interpreting the plain 
language of section 3C1.1, and accordingly hold that the 
two-level enhancement is mandatory once a district court 
determines that a defendant has obstructed justice. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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